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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
N. M. LONG & COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, and MAGGIE J. SMITH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
R. KAY MOWER and MRS. M. H. 
MOWER, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention 
and Appellamts, 
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C A N N 0 N - PAP ANIKOLAS C 0 N -
STRUCTION COMPANY, a partner-
ship, EDWARD H 0 L ME S, and 
GRANT JENSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8999 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action to recover damages which are alleged 
to have resulted from Respondents' installation of drains in 
their lands for the purpose of rendering the same suitable 
for subdividing and building homes thereon, the Appellants 
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2 
claiming that the drains reduced the "static pressure" of the 
water seeping through the ground, thereby decreasing the 
amount of water of and flowing from a pond, to which 
water Appellants claim the right to use. 
Hereinafter, for convenience, Appellants will be re-
ferred to as plaintiffs and Respondents as defendants. 
In addition to demanding judgment for damages, the 
complaint of N. M. Long & Company and Maggie J. Smith 
prays that defendants be enjoined from continuing the 
operation of the drains (R. 5) . But, this relief was elim-
inated as an issue under the pretrial order (R. 24) and 
properly so because if defendants were liable, plaintiffs' 
remedy at law for damages, if any were sustained, would 
have been adequate and, furthermore, the county which be-
came vested with the ownership and control of the drains 
through the dedication of the subdivision (R. 22, 248, Sec. 
57-5-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953) and the persons who 
had purchased and owned homes within the subdivisions at 
the commencement of the action would be indispensable 
parties to any suit which sought by a mandatory injunction 
to destroy their properties by requiring defendants to dis-
continue the operation of said drains (R. 257, 304-305). 
Hence, the facts found by the court, if sustained by any 
substantial evidence in the record, are conclusive on this 
appeal. In this respect, it should be noted that the trial 
court, in addition to hearing the evidence and observing the 
witnesses, pursuant to stipulation of counsel, visited the 
area and examined the premises involved in this action (R. 
308-309, 344). 
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The land owned and subdivided by defendants (herein 
sometimes referred to as the Subdivision) consists of ap-
proximately ninety-two acres (R. 50, Ex. 5, 6 & 7) lying 
north of a street running east and west, known as Spring 
Lane (about 5100 South, Salt Lake County, Utah) and 
between Hyland Drive and 1300 East Street of said county. 
The land owned by the plaintiffs, R. K. Mower and Mrs. 
Mower (herein sometimes referred to as the Mower Prop-
erty) consists of approximately seven acres (R. 100-101) 
and is located south of said Spring Lane and southeasterly 
from the southeast corner of the Subdivision. The land 
owned by the plaintiff, Maggie J. Smith, approximately six 
acres (R. 282) (herein sometimes referred to as the Smith 
Property) lies north of said lane and some distance west 
of the Subdivision. The land owned by the plaintiff, N. M. 
Long Company (herein sometimes referred to as the Long 
Property) consists of approximately nineteen acres (R. 227) 
and likewise lies north of said lane and west of the Smith 
Property, being at the northeast corner of Spring Lane and 
1300 East Street (Ex. 12 and 35). 
A pond is located on the Mower Property, herein and 
in the evidence referred to as the "Mower Pond", (R. 70, 
Ex. 8) . The Mower Pond is supplied and sustained by 
water which escapes through seepage from Cottonwood 
Creek and the seepage water resulting from the irrigation 
of lands of a higher elevation and lying to the east of the 
Mower Pond (R. 51, 108). 
The Mower Pond was created by digging, excavating 
and draining in the sloughs on or near the Mower Property 
(R. 51, 117-118). It is apparent that the excavations on 
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the Mower Property not only created the pond, but served 
to drain the remaining Mower premises. in order to render 
the·m suitable for the construction of the dwelling and 
other improvements now located on said premises (R. 117-
118). At the west end of the Mower Pond is a headgate 
which controls the flow of water from the pond into a ditch, 
herein and in the evidence referred to as the "Long Ditch" 
(R. 173, Ex. 12, 34). This ditch runs some distance west 
along the south side of Spring Lane, then crosses said lane 
and runs westerly to the Smith and Long Properties (R. 
102, 173, Ex. 8, 12). 
For illustration and as a convenient reference for the 
court, there is contained in an appendix hereto a map show-
ing the location of the properties involved herein, the Mower 
Pond, the Long Ditch and Spring Run. 
Defendants purchased the lands embraced within the 
Subdivision for the purpose of subdividing the same and 
constructing residential dwellings thereon (R. 52, 254). 
When acquired by defendants, said' lands were swampy and 
mostly wet pasture (R. 52, 7, 246, 305). In order to render 
their lands suitable for subdividing and building thereon, 
defendants, under the supervision of a licensed engineer, 
installed drains in said lands ( R. 53, 215) . In this connec-
tion, the trial court found : 
"Said drains were installed by said defendants, 
not to claim or destroy or decrease or interfere with 
plaintiffs' or intervening plaintiffs' water rights, 
but for the purpose of improving said defendants' 
own lands by increasing their value and making them 
productive, which otherwise would remain of little 
or no value as merely a slough" (R. 53). 
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The bottom of the Mower Pond is approximately 11 feet 
higher in elevation than the ground level of the Subdivision 
(R. 51, 105, Ex. 9). The nearest drain to the Mower Pond 
lies some 350 feet northwesterly from the pond (R. 51, 106). 
The drains collect and return to a creek lying northwesterly 
of the Subdivision the same water which prior to the in-
stallation of the drains had flowed or drained from the 
subdivision lands into said creek (R. 51, 109-110, 250, 256). 
This creek is known as "Spring Run" and also as "Spring 
Creek", but will be referred to herein only as Spring Run 
so as not to confuse it with a "Spring Creek", not involved 
in this case (R. 331-332). All the water deposited by the 
drains into Spring Run had been appropriated by persons 
who are not parties to this action and defendants could not 
lawfully have diverted the same (R. 204-205, Ex. 24-25). 
The trial court found : "There has been a decrease in 
the amount of the seepage waters that came to the surface 
as springs and then flowed into the Long Ditch, or the other 
ditch bringing water a short distance to the pond, but not 
by any wrongful act of said defendants. There is no direct 
evidence in the record that said drains in any way shut off 
the waters from the plaintiffs, either in the Mower Pond 
or ditch" (R. 53) . 
It has been stipulated that defendants have never 
claimed any rights to the use of any waters involved or re-
ferred to in this case, and there are no competitive claims 
to such waters (R. 53, 258, 306, 308). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Defendants, by draining their lands to improve 
and make a reasonable use thereof, are not liable to plain-
tiffs, even though as an incident to such drainage plaintiffs 
were damaged by a decrease in the amount of seepage 
waters to which they claimed a right of use. 
2. The installation of the drains in defendants' sub-
division was not the legal cause of plaintiffs' alleged dam-
ages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO.1 
DEFENDANTS, BY DRAINING THEIR LANDS 
TO IMPROVE AND MAKE A REASONABLE 
USE THEREOF, ARE NOT LIABLE TO PLAIN-
TIFFS, EVEN THOUGH AS AN INCIDENT TO 
SUCH DRAINAGE PLAINTIFFS WERE DAM-
AGED BY A DECREASE IN THE AMOUNT 
OF SEEPAGE WATERS TO WHICH THEY 
CLAIMED A RIGHT OF USE. 
At the outset, it is important to point out that this 
case does not present a controversy involving the competi-
tive use of water. In cases such as the instant case, it is the 
settled law of this state, under the common law, and as 
adopted by the Restatement, that a land owner is not liable 
for interference with subterranean waters to which another 
has the right of use, if such interference results as an inci-
dent to the land owner's reasonable use of his own land 
and without negligence or malice on his part. Roberts vs. 
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Gribble, 43 U. 411, 134 P. 1014; Peterson vs. Cache County 
Drainage District, 77 U. 256, 294 P. 289; 29 A. L. R. 2d 
1356; 109 A. L. R. 395; 55 A. L. R. 1386; Restatement of 
the Law of Torts, Sec. 849. 
In an early decision by this court, Roberts vs. Gribble, 
(supra), it was held that a land owner had a right to drain 
seepage and percolating waters from his land which ren-
dered it swampy and marshy and unfit for cultivation, even 
though in so doing the land owner interfered with another's 
right to the use of underground waters. 
The opinion states : 
"We think the evidence both for appellants and 
respondent tends to show that the waters in dispute 
are seepage and percolating waters. These waters 
rose in such quantities on respondent's land that it 
became submerged and was rendered unfit for the 
raising of hay and other farm products. The respon-
dent undoubtedly had a right to drain his land of 
the water and put it in a condition for raising crops. 
Whether he did this by sinking wells or by digging 
drain ditches was of no concern to appellants." 
In the Drainage District case, the District had con-
structed drainage canals for the purpose of draining the 
lands within the district, one of which canals was con-
structed near plaintiff's land. As a result of the construc-
tion of the drains, the water table within plaintiff's land 
was lowered so that he could not subirrigate his land and 
produce crops thereon as he previously had done. The court 
held that the District was not liable to the plaintiff because 
the proprietors of the lands within the District had a right 
to improve their lands by draining them and if done so 
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without malice or negligence, they were not liable for the 
consequent lowering of the water table within plaintiff's 
land. 
The Restatement (Torts, Sec. 849) in setting forth the 
rules governing liability in such cases, points out an im-
portant distinction between the rules applicable to contro-
versies involving a competitive use of water and those 
applicable to the instant case: 
"b. Conduct no·t involving a competing use of 
water. The distinction between conduct which con-
stitutes a 'use of water' and conduct which does not 
involve its utilization but merely affects its quality 
or quantity is explained in Sec. 847, Comment a. 
Interferences with one person's use of water by an-
other's use of water involve a conflict over the same 
physical substance, and raise problems of proprie-
tary competition over that substance. These inter-
ferences are dealt with in Sees. 850-864. Interfer-
ences with a person's use of water by another's use 
of land or other activity which affects water only 
incidentally, do not directly raise problems of pro-
prietary competition over the water itself, and there-
fore, in substance, involve the same questions as 
other types of interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of land. Consequently, the rules stated in Sees. 
822-840, governing invasions of interests in the use 
and enjoyment of land, are equally applicable to 
such interferences \Vith a use of water." 
For illustration of the rule applicable to cases not in-
volving a competing use of water, the Restatement, Torts, 
at page 338, cites the following: 
"5. The A Mining Co. buys land and starts to 
mine for coal therein. In the process of excavation, 
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the flow of subterranean water is interfered with, 
and a spring on near-by land in the possession of 
B dries up as a result. A's operations do not involve 
a use of subterranean water, and its liability to B 
is governed by the rules stated in Sees. 822-840." 
Under such circumstances, the land owner's liability 
depends on whether his conduct is "(i) intentional and un-
reasonable; or (ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable 
under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless 
or ultrahazardous conduct." Restatement, Torts, Sec. 822. 
The rationale of the rule herein dealt with is rather 
well stated in the early case of Wheatley vs. Baugh, (1855) 
25 Pa. 528, 64 Am. Dec. 721, 13 Mor. Min. Rep. 37 4 (cited 
in 55 A. L. R. at page 1426) wherein the court says: 
"But percolations (of water) spread in every 
direction through the earth, and it is impossible to 
avoid disturbing them without relinquishing the 
necessary enjoyment of the land. Accordingly the 
law has never gone so far as to recognize in one man 
a right to convert another's farm to his own use for 
the purposes of a filter. Such a claim, if sustained, 
would amount to a total abrogation of the right of 
property. No man could dig a cellar, or a well, or 
build a house on his own land, because these opera-
tions necessarily interrupt the filtrations through 
the earth. Nor could he cut down the forest and clear 
his land for the purposes of husbandry, because the 
evaporation which would be caused by exposing the 
soil to the sun and air would inevitably diminish, to 
some extent, the supply of water which would' other-
wise filter through it. He could not even turn a 
furrow for agricultural purposes, because this would, 
partially, produce the same result." 
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The first cases dealing with the rule applicable to con-
troversies not involving a competitive use of water arose 
in England and held that the land owner was absolutely 
absolved from liability, at least in the absence of negligence 
or malice. Apparently, this is the majority rule in the 
United States. 29 A. L. R. 2d 1358. However, many cases 
in this country follow a so-called American rule which 
qualifies the English rule by holding that the land owner's 
immunity from liability depends on whether his conduct 
causing an interference with subterranean waters is rea-
sonably necessary in connection with the use and improve-
ment of his land. The latter rule has been referred to by 
the text writers and some courts as the "doctrine of correla-
tive rights" or the "doctrine of reasonwble use". In 29 A. 
L. R. 2d at page 1364, the so-called American rule is stated 
as follows: 
"Under the rule or doctrine of correlative rights, 
as applied in most jurisdictions, the owner or occu-
pant of the containing land is not precluded from 
utilizing it for any lawful and proper purpose to 
which it is adapted, without liability for incidental 
interference with the waters, and is required only 
to so exercise his proprietary rights as not unreason-
ably or unnecessarily to obstruct or divert such 
waters to the injury of neighboring proprietors. To 
state the propositiou more concisely, immunity de-
pends up-on whether the inte1·terence was reasoruLb~y 
necessa.J'y in connection 1cith the use or improvement 
of th(' la.nd." (Emphasis added.) 
To characterize the American rule as the "doctrine of 
correlative rights" or "doctrine of reasonable use", though 
perhaps not inapt, is unfortunate as the same terminology is 
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utilized by the courts with reference to the rules applicable 
to cases involving competitive claims to underground water. 
Hence, in considering the authorities applicable to the pres-
ent case, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction, as 
pointed out by the Restatement, between the rules applic-
able to the instant case, and those governing cases involv-
ing the competitive use of water. The judicial decisions, 
on their facts and holdings, clearly recognize the distinction 
irrespective of the language employed in the opinions. The 
Supreme Court of Florida took occasion in the case of 
Labruzzo vs. Atlantic Dredging & Construction Co., (1951 
Florida) 54 So. 2d 673, 29 A. L. R. 2d 1346, to point out 
that the so-called doctrine of correlative rights or reason-
able use pertaining to cases involving competitive claims to 
underground water is not applicable to cases concerning the 
interference with water by another's use of land. The court 
states in this respect : 
"In the instant case, however, we are concerned 
with an interference with plaintiffs' use of the 
spring on their land, caused by conduct of the de-
fendant not involving a competing use of water and 
in which the effect on the subterranean water is only 
incidental to the defendant's use of its land. Ob-
viously, then, the rule of 'reasonable use', as en-
grafted upon the old common-law rule of absolute 
and unqualified ownership of percolating waters, 
insofar as the proprietary beneficial use of the ~vater 
is concerned, has no application here where we are 
concerned with the proprietary use of land, and 
in which the water is only incidentally affected." 
So far as our research has disclosed, all courts follow 
either the so-called English rule or the American rule, with 
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the lone exception of California. Whether this court follows 
the English rule or the American rule, in either case the 
defendants are not liable under the facts established in this 
case: It is stipulated that the controversy herein does not 
involve a competing use of water. It is established by the 
evidence and findings of fact and conceded by the pleadings, 
that the installation of the drains was reasonably necessary 
in connection with the use and improvement of defendants' 
lands. It is not claimed that the defendants, in draining 
their lands to render them suitable for building homes 
thereon, acted negligently, with malice or intent to do harm 
to plaintiffs, defendants' sole intent and purpose being to 
improve and make a reasonaJble use of their own lands. As 
found by the court: "Said drains were installed by said 
defendants, not to claim or destroy or decrease or interfere 
with plaintiffs' or intervening plaintiffs' water rights, but 
for the purpose of improving said defendants' own lands 
by increasing their value and making them productive, which 
otherwise would remain of little or no value as merely a 
slough." 
Under their point that "plaintiffs were entitled to in-
junctive relief", plaintiffs cite a recent decision of this 
court, Kano vs. Arcon Cm·poration, (June 10, 1958) 7 U. 
2d 431, 326 P. 2d 719. While the question of plaintiffs' 
right to injunctive relief is not pertinent on this appeal, 
we desire to point out that the issues considered in the Kano 
case are clearly distinguishable from those presented in 
the present case : The Kano case, unlike the instant case, 
involved an intentional and unreasonable invasion of prop-
erty rights, and the diversion of waters of a natural surface 
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stream to which plaintiffs had acqured a right of use, as a 
consequence of which plaintiffs were required to provide 
other facilities, including pumping equipment, to retake 
their water and, because of the time required to do so, plain-
tiffs lost their celery crop which they were about to plant. 
To provide adequate relief for such an intentional and un-
reasonable invasion of plaintiffs.' rights, the plaintiffs. were 
awarded damages for loss of their crop and defendants were 
required to deposit the water at the boundary of plaintiffs' 
land so that they could enjoy a gravity flow. 
The facts in the instant case are different from the 
Kano case in every material respect: Plaintiffs' impounding 
and diversion facilities were not interfered with by defen-
dants. The waters collected and deposited by the drains 
into Spring Run are the same waters that formerly had 
drained into said creek from the lands within the Subdi-
vision. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants had any right to 
the use of the waters of said creek It is plaintiffs' sole con-
tention in this action that defendants (and for that matter 
anyone else in the neighborhood) must perpetually leave 
their property in a swampy condition so as not to disturb 
the "static pressure" necessary to sustain the waters of a 
pond previously created in connection with the drainage of 
the Mower premises. And to that end, plaintiffs now claim 
they are entitled to a mandatory injunction to restore· the 
Subdivision to a slough. 
POINT NO.2 
THE INSTALLATION OF THE DRAINS IN DE-
FENDANTS' SUBDIVISION WAS NOT THE 
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LEGAL CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGED 
DAMAGES. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision (R. 32, 33) 
and findings of fact (R. 53), found that: "There has been 
a decrease in the amount of the seepage waters that came 
to the surface as springs and then flowed into the Long 
Ditch, or the other ditch bringing water a short distance 
to the pond, but not by any wrongful act of said defendants. 
There is no direct evidence in the record that said drains 
in any way shut off the waters from the plaintffs, either 
in the Mower Pond or ditch." 
Since as an element in establishing defendants' liability, 
plaintiffs had the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that defendants' installation of the drains was 
a proximate cause of the alleged interference with said sub-
terranean seepage waters, the above findings are tanta-
mount to a finding of fact that the decrease in the amount 
of said waters was not attributable to defendant's conduct. 
Plaintiffs' failure to prove such element necessary to de-
fendants' liability, in and of itself, sustains the trial court's 
judgment. Restatement, Torts, Sec. 822. 
The record indicates a number of factors which reason-
ably could account for the decrease in the amount of said 
seepage waters : The waters sustaining the Mower Pond 
have their source in seepage from Big Cottonwood~ Creek 
and irrigated lands lying at a higher elevation to the east 
of said pond. Such seepage water is perched over a tight 
layer of non-pervious material (R. 57, 106). A large sewer 
system had been constructed throughout the area coincident 
with the installation of the drains. The sewer lines lying 
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east and at a higher elevation than the Mower property were 
laid upon a gravel base which operated as drains and di-
verted part of said seepage waters before reaching the pond. 
Said sewer lines also collected within the pipes a subsantial 
amount of water which formerly formed a part of the seep-
age waters (R. 258, 259, 260-262, 267-268, 333-344). It is 
common knowledge that farm acreage lying east of the pond 
which formerly had supplied part of the seepage water from 
the irrigation of said lands, has in recent years been utilized 
increasingly for building homes. Weather conditions could 
have been a factor in the diminished amount of seepage. 
And, as indicated by the trial judge (who visited the prem-
ises) in his memorandum decision, the failure to service the 
ditches and drains which collected and deposited the seepage 
water in the pond, in and of itself, could account for the 
diminished amount of water flowing into the pond (R. 33). 
Hence, the trial court properly concluded that plain-
tiffs had not sustained their burden of proving that the 
drains interfered with the waters in question. To have 
found otherwise would have been pure speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the trial court's findings 
of fact are sustained by substantial evidence and the judg-
ment is in accordance with the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, RAWLINS, 
JONES & HENDERSON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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